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In an action for the price of goods sold and delivered the defendant pleaded
infancy. He sought to prove the plea by a statement contained in an affidavit made
in a chancery suit, to which the plaintiff was not a party, by the defendant's famer,
since deceased.
Held, that there being no question of pedigree in the case, the evidence was not
admissible.
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In an action for 7311. for goods sold and delivered, the defendant
pleaded that at the time of the alleged purchase he was an infant
under the age of twenty-one years, and that the things were not
necessaries. The trial before GROVE, J., and a special jury resulted
in a verdict for the plaintiff for 41. 16s., for things which were found
to be necessaries. The plaintiff applied for a new trial, on the
ground of the improper reception of evidence in favor of the
defendant.
The evidence in question was admitted in support of the plea of
infancy, and consisted of a statement as to the date of the defendant's birth, contained in an affidavit made in a chancery suit, to
which the plaintiff was not a party, by the defendant's father, who
had since died.
STEPHEN and MATHEW, JJ., having ordered a new trial,
The defendant appealed.
Willis, Q. C., and L. Glyqn, for the defendant.
Lumley Smilth, Q. C., and H. D. Greene, for the plaintiff.
BRETT, M. R.-In this case the action was for the price of certain goods sold by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the sale must
have been either for an agreed price or for a reasonable price. The
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defence is that at the time when the bargain was made, supposing
it was for an agreed price, it was not binding, because at that time
the defendant was under twenty-one years of age. We have to
consider' what is the rule of evidence which may be applicable
to'this and to many other cases. The evidence which was said to
have been admissible was a declaration in an affidavit by the defendant's father, who had since died, as to the date of the defendant's
birth, and, if it were admissible, it would be very strong evidence
to show that when the defendant made this bargain he was under
twenty-one years of age. Then arises the question whether in such
a suit as this, upon such a dispute as this, with regard to such an
issue as this, that evidence was admissible. It is obvious that the
question of what family the defendant belonged to is wholly immaterial, as also is the question of whose son he was. The question
whether he was a legitimate or natural son, or an elder or younger
son, is also wholly immaterial. There is no question of family in
the matter. The question is of the time when he was born, and
that has nothing to do with any family question which can be suggested. Then arises this problem: Can this evidence, with regard
to such a question so stated, be received in evidence against the
present plaintiff? It cannot be, of course, unless there is some
rule of law by which a mere declaration upon such a question so
stated is evidence against all the world. It cannot be doubted that
this is what is called hearsay evidence, which, as a general rule, is
not admissible. Therefore the case must be brought within the
recognised exceptions to that rule. It seems to me that the case
cannot be argued merely upon principle. The law of evidence in
England has been determined by the authority of successive decisions of the courts. It is a branch of law which depends entirely
upon the authority of the courts; therefore we must look to the
decisions to see whether this exception to the acknowledged rule
has ever been admitted. There are many well-known exceptions
which it would be difficult to make out for the first time to be
rightly admitted. Nay, there are great authorities who think that
the original rule is bad for the purpose of arriving at the truth.
But it is no part of the province of the court to consider whether
that rule is good or bad, or to enunciate a new principle with regard
to those exceptions; we must see what are the recognised exceptions.
Now, we have a recent declaration of what the exceptions are by
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Lord BLACKBURN, who enumerates them in Sturla v. Preccia,
5 Appeal Cases, at page 640. He says: "It is not disputed
that the general rule of English law is that hearsay evidence
is not receivable; one reason probably is the want of the safeguards
of cross-examination ; however, undoubtedly, the'law is that, as
a general rule, hearsay evidence is not admissible. But to that a
great many exceptions have been introduced. I do not see that
if we were but beginning to make the law we should be able to say
exactly why so much should be admitted and no more; probably
it would be difficult to say that in all cases; but the exceptions
have been established and exist, and we have to see whether this
case comes within any one of those. Now, the first and one of
the most important exceptions is briefly expressed in a dictum in
Riglham v. Ridgway, 10 E. 109, that documents on the face
of them appearing to be against the interest of a deceased person
who stated the matter are evidence. I need not enter into the
qualifications of that further than to point out that in no point of
view can this Giunta di Marinawho made this statement (and who
presumably are all dead by this time) be said to have been making
statements against their own pecuniary interests. Then there is a
second class of cases, of which Price v. Lord Torrington, 1 Salk.
285, may be mentioned as being the earliest, establishing that
where a deceased person in the course of his duty makes a contemporaneous entry of an act which he has done, and returns that in
the course of his business, then after his death it would be received
as evidence. That class of cases is also well established. There,
again, I do not go into the qualifications, or express any opinion
upon the different matters introduced, further than to point out that
in no sense can it be said that the Giunta di Marina was making
any statement in the course of business contemporaneous with the
fact, and it is impossible to say that it falls within that principle.
Then comes another large class of cases, where, from the nature of
the thing, evidence of reputation from deceased persons, is admissible; where it is a public right, or a quasi public right, evidence
of reputation is admissible if you prove that the deceased person
was of the class who would know it and had stated ii. Upon that,
again, I merely say that the question we are now inquiring intoviz., the history of a private individual-is not a matter in which,
in any sense, reputation generally can be received. Then. there is
another class of cases which comes nearer to it. It has been estab-
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lished for a long while that, in questions of pedigree-I suppose
upon the ground that they were matters relating to a time long
past, and that it was really necessary to relax the strict rules of
evidence there for the purpose of' doing justice-but, for whatever
reason, the statement of deceased members of the family made ante
litem motam, before there was anything to throw doubt upon them,
are evidence to prove pedigree, and such statements by deceased
members of the family may be proved, not only by showing that
they actually made the statements, but by showing that they acted
upon them, or assented to them, or did anything .that amounted to
showing that they recognised them. If any member of the family,
as a person who presumably would know all about the family, had
stated such and such a pedigree, that evidence would be receivable,
its weight depending upon other circumstances."
I take it that Lord BLACKBURN intended to make an exhaustive
enumeration of the exceptions; therefore the exception which is
applicable here is, where there is a qubstion of pedigree to prove
which the evidence is given. If that is true, and it is true, as I
have stated, that there is no question of family at all in this matter,
how can any one say that this evidence was given in a question of
pedigree to prove pedigree ? The case is not brought within the
exceptions; therefore it would be wrong to try and explain all the
cases cited. There is not a decision, but a strong opinion of PATTESON, J., in Figg v. Wedderzrn, 11 L. J. Q. B. 45, that, in such
a case, the question is not one of pedigree, and therefore the
evidence is not admissible. So also, in Plant v. Taylor, 7 H.
& N. 227, POLLOCK, 0. B., says that, in an action for the price of
goods sold and delivered, the declarations of deceased persons are
not admissible to prove that the defendant is an infant, though it
is different where the question is one of pedigree. For the reasons
I have given, I take it this is not a question of pedigree within
the meaning of that word as used by the judges when they established the exceptions. Therefore the case is,
not within any exception to the rule against the admissibility of hearsay evidence. On
that ground I am of opinion that the evidence was not admissible, and, therefore, that the decision of the Divisional Court was
right, and that the appeal must be dismissed.
BoWEN, L. J.-I am of the same opinion. I only add a word
in order to emphasize the exact point which this case decides-viz.
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that, in such a suit as this, upon such an issue as this, the declaration of a deceased person is not admissible to prove infancy, the
question not being as to arty family at all, but as to the age of the
particular defendant.
FRY, L. J.-I am entirely of the same opinion. The law laid
down by Ld. BLACKBURN in the House of Lords was exactly that laid
down a hundred years ago in -. v. Inhab, of Eriswell, 3 T. R. 707,
by Ld. KENYON, who said: "I admit that declarations of the
members of a family, and perhaps of others living in habits of intimacy with them, are received in evidence as to pedigrees ; but
evidence of what a' mere stranger has said has ever been rejected in
such cases. That, however, has been always understood to be an
excepted case and to stand on reasons peculiar to itself, which I need
not take up time by stating." Therefore he states that the exception
is confined to questions of pedigree. The question here is simply
whether the defendant had attained the age of twenty-one; any question as to the father or mother of the defendant is wholly immaterial; therefore, there is no question of pedigree in this case. I am
therefore of opinion that the appeal must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed
The burden of proving the fact of
infancy is on the defendant who sets it
up, being one of those facts peculiarly
within his knowledge Borthwick v. Carruthers, 1 T. R. 648; Stewart v. Ashley,
34 Mich. 183 ; Jeune v. Ward, 2 Stark.
330; Bay v. Gunn, I Denio 108;
Hartley v. Wharton, 11 Ad. & El. 934.
And ordinarily it should be proved, like
any other fact, by competent evidence ;
and proof "by inspection" has been
thought not to be a part of our law:
Met. on Cont., p.44. Still, if the defendlant offers himself as a witness, the jury
may take into consideration his appearance, as that may furnish satisfactory
evidence that he was or was not of age,
at some particular time ; though not establishing the exact date of his birth :
Commonwealth v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 8.
And a person himself may testify to his
own age: Hill v.Eldridqe. 126 Mass. 234;
Cheever v. Congdon, 34 Mich. 296 ; State

v. Cain, 9 W. Virg. 568. So, of course,
may his relatives who have known him
personally from his infancy : Kellogg v.
Kimball, 126 Mass. 163.
Entries of a baptism on a baptismal
register, made in the course of official
duty, though not direct evidence of the
date of a person's birth stated therein,
may still be used to prove the date of baptism, as well as the fact, and with evidence aliunde of the person's age at his
baptism, may indirectly aid in establishing
the date of his birth: Whitaker v. 3eLaughlin, 115 Mass. 168. And that
such entry is proof of the date of baptism
as well as the fact, see the -interesting
opinion of GitA,
J., in Kennedy v.
Doyle, 10 Allen 161.
As to the precise point involved in the
principal case, the American text-writers
seem to confine the admissibility of such
evidence to cases where the issue on trial
involves some question of pedigree or re

